'The Enigma of Social Harm and the Barrier of Liberalism: Why Zemiology Needs a Theory of the Good' by Raymen, TW
The Enigma of Social Harm and the Barrier of Liberalism: 
Why Zemiology needs a theory of the Good 
Thomas Raymen, Plymouth University 
 
Abstract 
 
Social harm is one of the most potentially potent and transformative concepts 
currently available to the social sciences. However, scholars have struggled to define 
social harm, puzzled by enigmatic questions and tensions around the issue of how to 
establish clear conceptual parameters which take advantage of social harm’s broader 
critical focus, whilst preventing the concept from becoming so nebulous that it loses 
all utility. This article suggests that the enigma of social harm is not simply a 
problem of having yet to find an adequate definition and set of conceptual 
parameters. Rather, the uncertainty that surrounds social harm and the proliferation 
of harms we are witnessing in late-capitalism are both positioned as symptomatic of 
far deeper social problems generated by a combination of liberalism’s flawed 
conception of the autonomous individual subject and postmodernism’s cynical 
individualism and dismantling of belief in any transcendent authority or ethics that 
can constitute what philosopher Slavoj Žižek describes as the ‘Big Other’. However, 
such discoveries provide us with a roadmap out of zemiology’s conceptual crisis. 
This article argues that by revisiting the moral philosophy of Alasdair Macintyre and 
Slavoj Žižek’s ontology of the subject, we can shake-off liberal-postmodernism’s 
ethical ‘culture of emotivism’, abandon liberalism’s a priori ethical maxims, and 
begin to reinstate the Big Other by developing a transformative theory of the Good 
and human flourishing from which we can derive a clear understanding of social 
harm.  
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The Enigma of Social Harm 
 
Some of the most significant problems facing contemporary society not only lie 
beyond the present scope of legal prohibition but are thoroughly normalized and 
integral to the functioning of liberal-capitalist political economy. Climate change 
(Wainwright and Mann, 2018); the rise of far-right nationalist groups (Winlow et al, 
2017); crises in housing and employment (Lloyd, 2013; Madden and Marcuse, 
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2016); resource wars (Parenti, 2011); a libertarian financial elite generating 
widening gaps of inequality (MacLean, 2017); and a socially corrosive consumer 
culture generating harsh interpersonal competition, indebtedness and significant 
mental health issues (Cederström and Spicer, 2015; Raymen and Smith, 2017) are 
just a few examples of the issues currently facing contemporary society that could 
be broadly grouped under the term social harm.  
 
Despite these grave problems, there is a paucity of coherence or consensus around 
the conceptualization of social harm and its parameters. There is a palpable 
diffidence when it comes to deciding which social practices should be considered 
genuinely harmful or only ‘mildly injurious’ outcomes that are to be tolerated as the 
‘price of freedom’ (Hall and Winlow, 2018). The fundamental question rests on the 
ontological and ethical basis that underpins these decisions. As it stands, all we have 
is the intuitive claim that we know harm when we see it. As Yar (2012: 59) points 
out, social harm as a concept “is sustained by its intuitive moral-political appeal and 
‘common-sense’ purchase, but no more”. In publications discussing theories of 
social harm it is common for scholars to express concern around how broadly we 
should conceptualise social harm (Hillyard and Tombs, 2004; 2017; Lasslett, 2010; 
Pemberton, 2015). The crucial question often uttered but never comprehensively 
answered is this one: How can we establish clear conceptual parameters which take 
advantage of social harm’s broader critical focus yet avoid the concept from 
becoming so nebulous that it loses all utility and leaves itself open to accusations of 
relativism and moral subjectivism?  
 
We live in a society which lacks a common conception of the human and social 
good, a clear and rational basis for determining what that common good might be, 
and a grounded understanding of ethics that extends beyond negativistic rights-based 
ethics in order to determine what can be genuinely conceived of as social harm 
(MacIntyre, 2011). In the absence of these crucial elements, current theories of social 
harm exist in a state of partial paralysis, fearful of being derided as producing ‘catch-
all’ concepts or committing liberalism’s cardinal sin of piously curtailing the 
sovereign individual’s right to freely express her desires and preferences. 
Consequently, theorists tend to limit themselves to only the most visible and obvious 
forms of social harm, dismissing many genuinely harmful processes and practices 
as merely mildly injurious. Only those practices that generate sufficiently extreme 
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and problematic outcomes are discussed as unethical or harmful (see, for example, 
Lasslett, 2010).  
 
Ambiguity surrounding social harm could simply be a case of having yet to arrive at 
a consensus on an adequate definition. Given the scale of the task and the diverse 
nature of contemporary social practices, this ambiguity is to be expected. With a 
little more research, democratic debate, and tinkering with regards to our technical 
application of this concept (Hillyard and Tombs, 2004), such a definitional 
consensus could be seen to be within reach. However, the central premise of this 
article suggests a different approach. The faltering uncertainty around what 
constitutes social harm is symptomatic of a far deeper social malaise; a political and 
ethical paralysis that is generated by the moral philosophical, political-economic and 
cultural core of liberal-capitalist societies. Namely, the marriage between 
postmodernism and the political and moral philosophy of liberal individualism 
which the likes of Slavoj Žižek (2000; 2008) and Alain Badiou (2001) suggest have 
become the dominant form of politics and ethics in advanced capitalist societies. 
Liberalism has located both liberty and moral authority within the sovereign 
individual, leaving her free to pursue her privately defined and pluralistic notions of 
the Good life. Meanwhile, postmodernist skepticism has suspended belief in any set 
of authoritative customs or codes capable of transcending the liberal subject’s 
pluralistic notions of the Good and providing an objective reference point for ethics 
to arbitrate moral and zemiological disagreements. Consequently, the problem is not 
just that a consensus around social harm is hard to come by, but that the cynical 
individualism of liberal-postmodernism fundamentally precludes any such 
consensus being reached. Furthermore, the fusion of postmodernism’s skepticism 
with liberalism’s individualism has enabled liberalism—and more specifically, 
liberal capitalism—to become more fully itself and, consequently, more destructive 
(Deneen, 2018).  
 
As this cynical individualism undermines belief in the legitimacy of any cultural 
authority to curtail the freedoms of the sovereign individual, there is no guide to tell 
the individual that his consumer behaviour, financial practice or politico-cultural 
prejudices is illegitimate. The individual must rely on her own rational decisions 
guided by conscience and policed at the outer boundary by the crude categories of 
law. We are witnessing the effects of this in our contemporary context, as subjects 
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transcend the old protections of negative liberty and filter through the numerous 
loopholes of conscience and law to achieve neoliberalism’s asocial libertarian 
fantasy of total or ‘special liberty’ (Hall, 2012a; MacLean, 2017). Consequently, the 
cynical individualism of liberal-postmodernism not only precludes any consensus 
around what constitutes harm but also cultivates the cynical and potentially harmful 
subjects who feel justified in questioning or ignoring any authority that attempts to 
curtail their pursuit of self-interest.  
 
This article suggests that if the concept of social harm is to arrive at a point of 
meaningful coherence, zemiologists and criminologists must interrogate their 
ontological and ethical underpinnings by investigating the subjectivisation processes 
that operate in a deeper register than liberal idealism’s simplistic existential or 
discursive theories of subjectivity. The transcendental materialist philosophy of 
Slavoj Žižek can provide social harm scholars with a roadmap out of their current 
definitional crisis. Specifically, Žižek’s radically alternative model of ontology and 
how subjectivity comes into being can help us grasp the problems faced by a society 
plagued by liberal-postmodernism’s cynical individualism. Žižek offers a unique 
understanding of the corroded relationship that exists between the subject and the 
shared social space of culture, politics and ethics, and what is required to repair it 
(Johnston, 2008; Žižek, 1989; 2000). Therefore, a useful starting point for this article 
is to outline Žižek’s model of ontology. From here, we can work backwards and 
subsequently display how liberal-postmodernism not only precludes any consensus 
on what constitutes social harm but works in concert with capitalist political 
economy to cultivate harmful subjectivities rooted in anxiety and intense 
competitive individualism (Hall et al 2008) and hardened by their continuous 
experiences in a competitive yet disintegrating global economy (Crank and Jacoby 
2014). Finally, the article will consider what this means for existing social harm 
perspectives, specifically those rooted in theories of human need.  
 
Žižek’s Ontology 
 
Liberalism likes to convince us that we enter the world to develop quite quickly into 
fully-constituted, autonomous individuals who contractually choose to enter society. 
However, for Žižek (2000), what lies at the core of subjectivity is a void or the 
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‘Lacanian Real’. From birth we exist in a state without culture, besieged by raw 
internal drives and external stimuli of which we cannot make sense without the 
guidance of a Symbolic Order. This is the social world of symbols, customs, rules 
and values that provide a frame of reference with which we can identify, orient 
ourselves and make coherent sense of our lives. In the Lacanian Real, meaningful 
subjectivity cannot exist as such. Desperate to escape the terror of the Real, the 
subject must actively solicit a pre-existing Symbolic Order to establish any sense of 
coherence or ontological security (Hall, 2012b). For Žižek, contrary to Hobbes’ 
‘natural man’, identifying with such an order of symbols is not something to which 
the autonomous individual can contractually agree. It is a fundamentally necessary 
part of the formation of identity and subjectivity. The subject must submit to the rule 
of the Big Other which, in Žižek’s philosophy, constitutes the quasi-
anthropomorphic and therefore comprehensible politico-cultural embodiment of the 
Symbolic Order. As Winlow and Hall (2013) succinctly describe it, the Big Other is 
the broad network of social institutions, customs, ethical codes and laws into which 
the individual is socialised. It is only in this transition from the Real to the Symbolic 
Order that subjectivity can begin to constitute itself. The Symbolic Order provides 
the cultural substance that can ‘fill up’ the void of subjectivity. We are encouraged 
to seek and find meaning in politics, religion, tradition, government, communities 
and the purposeful social roles and functions they demand, all of which are imbued 
with symbolic meaning, values and ethics.   
 
However, for Žižek the Symbolic Order and the Big Other are not ‘real’ in any 
objective or material sense. Rather, they are a form of collective fiction and shared 
ideological illusion generated by a particular set of social and ethical principles and 
values which reflect our imagined vision of the Good life for individuals and society. 
As such, the Symbolic Order and Big Other can only exist and perform their function 
of ordering social life for as long as we act as if they exist. Therefore, the meaningful 
substance of the Symbolic Order is always an artifice. Collective commitment to and 
agreement upon these shared fictions are imperative if we are to maintain a well-
ordered, comprehensible and liveable social space. This is what Žižek terms 
symbolic efficiency. Living under this framework, the subject is always a subject of 
ideology. Žižek rejects the common understanding of ideology as a ‘false 
consciousness’ which distorts reality and prevents us from grasping it as such. 
Indeed, this is a common mistake perpetrated by social scientists and social harm 
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scholars who view ideology as fundamentally oppressive and backwards, and view 
utopia as non-ideological (Copson, 2016). Rather, it is the collective belief in and 
submission to the ideology of the Symbolic Order and the Big Other—be it utopian 
or regressive—that allows us to structure reality. Without the shared ideological 
illusion of the Symbolic Order—embodied by the Big Other’s network of 
institutions—we are left without any meaningful substance through which to 
construct reality and confront the trauma of the void that exists at the core of the 
subject.  
 
This is precisely why we are witnessing in our broad mass-mediated culture the 
constant and fervent reproduction of commitment to a liberal-capitalist system which 
is increasingly failing the majority, actively harming many others, and persisting far 
past its sell-by date. It is not that we are unaware of these realities. On the contrary, 
we are acutely aware them every day. However, without a viable alternative 
Symbolic Order with which the subject can identify, the subject is faced with a 
choice: To continue on and act as if they do not know of the unsustainable nature of 
contemporary capitalism, or risk returning to the Lacanian Real—a plunge into the 
void, a totally unexplained experiential and perceptual encounter with reality, an 
option which is persistently, albeit unconsciously, avoided (Žižek, 2008). This is one 
of the major lessons we learn from Žižek’s model of ontology. For the subject, any 
Symbolic Order is better than no Symbolic Order at all (Hall, 2012b). 
 
Therefore, to those scholars on the left who have dreamed of a post-ideological 
society in which the individual is, one day, to be liberated from the oppression of the 
Symbolic Order, Žižek would reply that they have fundamentally misconstrued 
freedom. To attempt to realise such a wish would be to consign the subject to an 
existence of crushing anxiety, uncertainty, and disorienting ontological insecurity as 
they scramble around in search of a set of fragile symbols and meanings that can 
structure and order their lives. Indeed, as many scholars of post-industrial consumer 
capitalism have suggested, this is precisely the world we currently occupy (Hall et 
al., 2008; Lasch, 1979; 1985; Raymen and Smith, 2016; 2017; Smith, 2014). The 
political responses to such widespread anxiety can be ugly and precisely what 
liberalism promised permanently to supersede (Hall et al. 2017). Therefore, we must 
now turn to an evaluation of liberal individualist moral philosophy, postmodernism 
and their destructive marriage with neoliberal consumer capitalism.  
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Liberal-Postmodernism Killed the Big Other 
 
Milbank and Pabst (2016) argue that the past fifty years of contemporary capitalism 
have been the story of an unspoken collusion of two liberalisms. At a basic 
philosophical level, the economic liberalism of the neoliberal-right and the socio-
cultural liberalism of the liberal-left are essentially mirror images of each other. The 
classical liberals and contemporary neoliberals of the right have espoused principles 
of liberty in their efforts to curtail the scope of government’s intervention in private 
property rights or imposition of regulations upon business1. Simultaneously, the 
socio-cultural liberalism of the left has advocated individual rights and freedom of 
self-expression on fields such as identity, consumer culture, and sexuality2, and 
permits government intervention insofar as it protects those liberties and ensures the 
avoidance of any mistreatment of the individual. This is the fundamental principle 
behind ‘negative liberty’. Of course, while they have been depicted as bitter enemies, 
these two liberalisms have long been in a tacit alliance; one that has served the 
interests of a post-industrial consumer capitalism grounded in notions of ‘freedom’ 
and ‘choice’ (Cremin, 2011; Lasch, 1985). The result has been the establishment of 
“a new, scarcely questionable consensus masquerading as a pragmatic centrism that 
concealed its ideological commitment to limitless liberations and mindless 
modernization” (Milbank and Pabst, 2016: 13).    
 
This is neither a caricature of liberalism nor a denial of the significant differences 
between these wings of liberal thought, nor a denial of the substantive variations 
within the liberal fold. Rather, this is an attempt to penetrate the core domain 
assumptions and common characteristics shared by positions across the broad liberal 
spectrum, which have developed as the foundational basis of modern moral 
philosophy, politics and perspectives on social harm. Firstly, they concentrate liberty 
and moral authority within an individual that achieved sovereignty by rebelling 
                                            
1 Although, as Will Davies (2017) has pointed out, big business leaders have repeatedly welcomed 
rapid government interventions into the financial affairs of the free-market as a temporary measure 
in order to rescue capitalist political economy from collapse during the aftermath of the 2007-2008 
Global Financial Crisis. 
2 However, as we have seen in recent years with Donald Trump, Brexit and the rise of far-right, left-
liberals have been just as quick as their economic liberal ‘opponents’ to abandon their own principles 
and no-platform far-right speakers.  
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against traditional collective institutions of moral, theological or political authority. 
They rejected the classical notion of human beings as possessing some natural 
teleological purpose and conceived of the human subject as a fully-constituted and 
autonomous individual who freely chooses to contractually enter into a society 
constituted only by floating, contractual and constantly renegotiated social 
relationships.  
 
For liberalism, in all its various guises, freedom is the right autonomously to pursue 
one’s privately defined notion of the good life unimpeded by intrusive moral or 
political authorities (MacIntyre, 2011). Immanuel Kant spells out the motto of 
modern liberal individualism and its rejection of belief in a transcendent moral or 
political authority when he writes, “Have courage to use your own reason!”; deriding 
the laziness of deferring to “a book which understands for me, a pastor who has a 
conscience for me, a physician who decides my diet, and so forth” (Kant, 1990: 83).  
There is no rightful moral authority to which we should defer or that transcends the 
self-reasoning and moral sovereignty of the individual. This approach facilitates a 
more systemic and wide-ranging critique that can show how both the liberal-right 
and liberal-left impede the formation of a consensus around what constitutes social 
harm. Furthermore, it enables us to see the problematic subjectivities that emerge 
when liberalism’s individual sovereignty combines with capitalism’s intense 
competitive individualism and postmodernism’s decimation of belief in any 
adjudicating authority. Hall (2012a) argues that such a cocktail has paved the way 
for subjectivities which attempt to burst through the flimsy protections of negative 
liberty to enact a destructive special liberty in which they transcend any remaining 
socio-ethical norms in the name of individual freedom.  
 
Early liberal thinkers could not foresee that the result of their ambitions would be 
the unstable context in which we exist today. Liberalism’s pluralistic individualism 
has slowly corroded, undermined or minimised the authority and scope of the 
Symbolic Order and the Big Other; particularly when combined with capitalism’s 
profit motive and the embedding of competitive individualism into all features of 
life (Davies, 2017). Indeed, Alasdair MacIntyre (2011) offered a seminal critique of 
modern liberal individualist moral philosophy, suggesting that liberalism’s 
enthusiastic abandonment of any transcendent moral authority was modern moral 
philosophy’s original mistake. This precipitated the rise of what he describes as the 
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“culture of emotivism”, in which the use of moral and evaluative judgments reflects 
nothing more than the expressions of individuals’ myriad arbitrary interests and 
preferences. Emotivism’s theory of meaning suggests that the meaning underneath 
an allegedly objective judgment such as “this is good”, is actually a subjective 
statement of “I approve of this, do so as well”. True emotivists or relativists would 
therefore accept that evaluative moral arguments are always subjective and arbitrary. 
MacIntyre’s argument, however, is that this theory of meaning has been abandoned 
in favour of a ‘cogent theory of use’, in that people use moral language only to 
express already-held arbitrary preferences. Since liberal individualism has rejected 
the telos or any final adjudicating authority that can transcend the sovereignty of the 
respective individuals in disagreement, we are faced with the situation we often find 
ourselves in: interminable moral disagreements or dilemmas which are 
fundamentally incommensurable and have no rational basis of resolving themselves. 
Therefore, as MacIntyre points out, for the criterionless, emotivist self, moral 
disagreement descends into a manipulative clash of wills, in which there is nothing 
to do but for “one will to align the attitudes, feelings, preference and choices of 
another with its own” (Macintyre, 2011: 28). The Other is reduced to a means to 
moral victory. Since there is no shared conception of the Good and only 
manipulatively won battles of private interests and preferences, there can be no 
meaningful consensus on morality, ethics or, in our case, social harm.  
 
What we are left with is negative liberty, a minimalistic series of rights and 
protections from abuse and mistreatment acting as a vague boundary for the milieu 
of free wills in permanent competition. These rights attempt to provide some a priori 
rules and laws that can stem the corrosive influence of liberal individualism’s 
underlying logic and deter sovereign individuals from exerting their desires too 
forcefully and with too much extremity upon vulnerable others. The prevention of 
powerful majorities from exercising their prejudices has certainly provided some 
protections for historically and systemically marginalised populations. However, 
this same logic has been used in a more perverted sense by libertarian financial elites 
to justify their own special liberty (Hall, 2012a) and neoliberal policies of relaxed 
economic regulation and corporate taxation. The encroachment of the state into such 
private economic affairs is seen as the illegitimate manipulation and coercion of a 
wealthy and successful minority by a tyrannical and inferior majority. Indeed, this 
is the precise argument of James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock (1962) in The 
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Calculus of Consent, two economists who were among the conceptual forefathers of 
contemporary neoliberalism (MacLean, 2017); in addition to the early Austrian 
neoliberals who saw democracy and human rights as useful insofar as it facilitated a 
peaceful exchange of governmental power, but should be curtailed and have rigid 
limits in its scope for politically intervening in the global economy (Slobodian, 
2018). Therefore, we cannot view the special liberty enacted by financial elites and 
violent low-level criminal actors as a gross transgression or perversion of 
liberalism’s underlying logic, but instead see it as a predictable outcome entirely in 
keeping with liberalism moral philosophical underpinnings. Therefore, as Badiou 
(2001) argues, the essential function of such negative liberties has always really been 
the preservation of capitalism’s status quo. Liberalism’s conception of the sovereign 
and autonomous individual is preserved and moral behaviour is reduced to an act of 
mere rule-following. There is no need to engage in a shared deliberation of the 
common Good and the kinds of subjectivities that we collectively wish to cultivate 
since, from a liberal standpoint, such issues cannot be settled. These minimalistic 
negative liberties constitute the basic measures which attempt to keep a watered-
down version of the Žižekian Big Other on life-support. This is the basic conclusion 
of philosopher Christopher Lutz (2012), who suggests that this culture of emotivism 
basically reflects the tense and fragile state of contemporary life under neoliberal 
consumer capitalism. As he writes, the contemporary culture of emotivism is:  
 
“[A] collection of autonomous individuals who struggle to balance 
individualism and collectivism, liberty and oppression, and chaos and control. 
They seek a rational basis for this balance, but they agree that moral choices 
are either essentially or effectively arbitrary. Each individual has her or his own 
arbitrary ends, and the state has another set of arbitrary ends; so questions about 
individualism and collectivism become questions of power” (Lutz, 2012: 58-
59). 
 
If liberalism’s advocacy of autonomous individualism has undermined the health of 
the Big Other, then postmodernism’s pan-scepticism has served as the force which 
could yet intensify liberalism’s individualistic drive to turn off the Big Other’s life-
support altogether. As outlined earlier, a properly functioning Symbolic Order and 
Big Other only exists as long as we act as if it exists. However, for postmodernism 
the Symbolic Order and the Big Other are just one amongst a constellation of 
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circulating truth claims, trying to pass themselves off as more legitimate or 
‘objective’ than others but, in reality, merely an assortment of socially constructed 
and renegotiable rules and conventions (Žižek, 2000). Therefore, postmodernism’s 
inexhaustible reflexivity has punctured this collective fiction and revealed the truth 
at the core of the Big Other—that its allegedly transcendent authority is not real in 
any objective or material sense that precedes active human maintenance. Under a 
healthy Symbolic Order, we might have gone along with and believed in the 
collective lie of community ties, ethical customs and taboos, unspoken rules and 
social obligations. However, postmodernism, particularly in its liberal guises, has 
suspended belief in the Symbolic Order, viewing its customs and meanings as 
ridiculous and often oppressive artificial conventions and unfounded beliefs. Every 
attempt at ideology is just a ploy to advance and protect the interests of those who 
devised it at the expense of others. This might seem to be a thoroughly positive 
development, abandoning the myths and parochial prejudices of modernity’s 
Symbolic Order. However, in denying belief in the Big Other, liberal-
postmodernism has thrown the baby out with the bathwater. It has corroded belief in 
any set of shared ethics, customs, values or rules that form the social content that 
fills up the void that lies at the subjective core of our being. As such, there can be no 
coherent basis for social harm or consistent guidance on how to govern our social 
conduct3. For Žižek, postmodernism signals the triumph of liberal-individualism, 
creating cynical and sceptical subjects who trust only in themselves, what they see 
before them, and who are constantly furnished with the tools to question the 
authority of the Big Other, or indeed any authority that attempts to curtail their own 
passions or desires.  
 
Winlow and Hall (2013) use the example of the doctor’s medical prognosis. 
Previously, submitting to the rule of a functioning Big Other, we would have 
accepted the doctor’s medical advice. Her degrees from universities, medical schools 
and her years of training indicate that she is a medical expert deserving of respect 
                                            
3 One might respond to this by observing that we live in a world full of rules and bureaucracies. These are 
the series of ‘little others’ which attempt to occupy the same space as the deceased Big Other and 
resolve the many situation-specific issues in our lives. However, as Winlow and Hall (2012; 2013) 
observe, these little others cannot be elevated to the status of the Big Other. They are just a tyranny of 
committees who do not have a fixed, objective or transcendent source. Therefore, the postmodern 
subject can undermine belief in these little others in precisely the same way. For a more in-depth 
discussion, see Winlow and Hall (2012) on ethics committees. 
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and we should defer to her informed judgment. However, in the contemporary 
context if we are told that we do not need to be admitted to hospital or given a 
medical prescription, we are more likely to sceptically assume that this is just a ploy 
by the NHS to free-up hospital beds or save money on expensive pharmaceuticals. 
Consequently, as Hall and Antonopoulous (2016) have observed, we are witnessing 
a rise in consumers’ purchasing of counterfeit pharmaceuticals after trusting their 
own individual judgment and self-diagnosis. Similarly, we could apply these ideas 
to examples of social harm explored by researchers in the field of ‘deviant leisure’ 
(Smith and Raymen, 2016), such as the ethical questions surrounding tourism and 
drinking holidays and the harms generated both to the environment and local 
populations (Briggs, 2013; Briggs and Ellis, 2016). Liberal-postmodernism’s 
cynical individualist is armed with an array of counter-arguments capable of 
downplaying the harms generated and questioning the authority of those who would 
position such practices as harmful. Who gave them authority to pass judgment? Why 
should I be discouraged from going on three luxury holidays a year, drinking to the 
extent that I vomit in the street and playing my music loudly in my private villa? 
Climate change is just an overblown moral panic that scientists have used to get 
research funding, and my frequent tourism provides plenty of jobs in communities 
where there is little else. Public morality is just a parochial social construct, the petty 
old-fashioned narrow-mindedness of others trying to intrude upon my fun and inhibit 
my ability to express myself and my sexuality (Jayne et al, 2006). As Winlow and 
Hall (2013: 156-157) write, “In this sense, postmodernism reanimates asocial 
libertarianism and fits neatly within the doctrine of neoliberalism: nothing exists 
beyond the immediate freedoms of the subject and no legitimate authority exists that 
can justifiably curtail those freedoms”.  
 
It is precisely within these environs of commodified leisure and consumer capitalism 
that social harm is most uncertain of itself. It is within leisure that we are culturally, 
economically and even politically represented as existing in a state of voluntarism. 
Seen to be rightfully enacting our individual freedom and leisure choices, leisure has 
not just been elevated to a social good but a moral right (Raymen, 2018). Within a 
society which places a primacy upon the liberty of the individual, Rojek (2010: 1) 
has written that “one may hardly dare speak of leisure in anything other than 
celebratory or triumphalist tones”. However, in an era of post-industrial consumer 
capitalism in which leisure markets are increasingly cultivated and deregulated due 
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to their demand-side value to the global economy, it is within these arenas of 
commodified leisure that some of the most normalised harms are being played out 
(see Smith and Raymen, 2016; Hayward and Smith, 2017). Indeed, postmodernism’s 
systematic suspension of disbelief in liberty’s telos, and its concomitant suspension 
of belief in any alternative mode of existence, allows liberal-capitalism and 
individualistic consumerism to fully realise its core drive of intense competitive 
individualism. Liberal-postmodernism’s suspension of belief in the Symbolic Order 
has denied the possibility of a fully-functioning Big Other to contradict the late-
modern consumer subject and whisper in her ear that a particular desire or leisure 
practice is harmful or illegitimate. Winlow and Hall (2013: 157) sum it up nicely: 
“if nothing is sacred there is nothing that cannot be enjoyed, and nothing that cannot 
be sold on commercial markets”. 
 
Postmodernism’s denial of belief in the Symbolic Order has left the contemporary 
subject scrambling for something in which they can anchor identity. Liberal-
postmodernism has treated this as a self-congratulatory gain; as the autonomous self 
was ‘freed’ from the social bonds and hierarchies of the Symbolic Order (MacIntyre, 
2011). However, for the likes of Žižek, while the late-capitalist subject pretends to 
enjoy the new-found ‘freedom’ and indeterminacy granted by the death of the Big 
Other, it is actually unconsciously experienced as an acute loss. As noted in an earlier 
section, identification with a coherent Symbolic Order is a fundamental aspect of 
identity formation, but the liberal-postmodern subject of late-capitalism has been 
‘cut adrift from its moorings (Young, 1999; 2007) and deprived of many of the firm 
boundaries around which identity could be oriented. Therefore, this so-called 
‘liberation’ has intensified rather than dissipated the need for something in which 
identity can be rooted, and the polysemic world of consumer capitalism has been 
happy to step into the void. Of course, consumer capitalism carefully cultivates 
dissatisfaction, generating profit by stimulating a sense of lack that can be assuaged 
by new commodities and experiences which could help the competitive individual 
distinguish herself from ‘the herd’ (Heath and Potter, 2006; McGowan, 2016). The 
looming anxiety and threat of cultural obsolescence looms in the background as the 
commodity’s life-cycle of cultural relevance shortens and demands regular 
abandonment. Therefore, using consumerism as the foundation of identity is like 
building a house made of beach sand as the tide rolls in and out. It quickly erodes 
The Enigma of Social Harm 
 
14 
 
and must be constantly rebuilt anew, irrespective of the interpersonal, socially 
corrosive, and environmental harms it generates.  
 
Liberal-postmodernism’s cynical disbelief ultimately results in the preservation of 
our existing political-economic and cultural arrangements. Global capitalism’s 
competitive drives and consumer culture’s individualism are depicted as the 
political-economic and cultural systems that appear closest to our nature as 
autonomous individuals (McGowan, 2016). We are told that any attempt to 
rejuvenate society on a radically new political, economic and ethical footing will 
inevitably lead to totalitarian disaster. This is what Mark Fisher (2009) describes as 
‘capitalist realism’, a deep and enduring form of collective nihilism in which we 
struggle to imagine a world beyond capitalism which occupies the ‘horizons of the 
thinkable’ (Fisher, 2009). This is the ultimate embodiment of liberal-
postmodernism, resulting in what Žižek (2008) describes as post-political bio-
politics. As he explains, this is a piece of immense theoretical jargon, but one which 
basically describes the current state of affairs in which society has renounced grand 
ideological causes or transformative visions of society based upon a new politics, 
economics and ethics but has instead set about the task of efficiently administering 
life as it currently exists. This applies neatly to much of the current zemiological 
landscape. Under this framework, the question of social harm is not an ethical issue 
or a departure point from which we can imagine a more desirable collective social 
existence, but more of a technical issue which attempts to engage in piecemeal 
‘harm-minimisation’. Rather than recognised as symptoms of deep but ultimately 
solvable social problems which are then interrogated and challenged, certain social 
harms are simply accepted as a fact of life and the price of our individual freedom. 
Social harms become transformed into risks to be managed; and the task of 
academics, politicians and policy makers becomes the devising of ingenious ways 
to mitigate the worst excesses of these harms without transgressing the ontological 
assumptions of liberalism or the economic needs of capital.   
 
What does this mean for existing perspectives on social harm? 
 
“If Evil exists, we must conceive it from the starting point of the Good” (Badiou, 
2001: 60) 
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This foray into the ontological, moral and political philosophical underpinnings of 
contemporary life in late-capitalism leaves us with the question of what this means 
for existing perspectives on social harm. While there have been a variety of 
suggested approaches to social harm (see Lasslett, 2010; Yar, 2012 for two 
examples), I specifically focus upon Pemberton’s (2015) approach rooted in theories 
of human need, which has been advocated by others in the field (Copson, 2011; 
Hillyard and Tombs, 2017). I do not focus upon this approach to social harm because 
it is any more deficient than other perspectives. On the contrary, while there are 
some fundamental flaws that stem from its underpinning intellectual influences, it is 
focused upon here because of its potential. Pemberton’s use of the notion of human 
flourishing opens up possibilities to re-establish what is missing from social harm 
perspectives—a natural human telos or clear notion of human flourishing around 
which an alternative Symbolic Order can be organised and can then serve as a 
guiding reference point for social harm to transcend postmodern liberal 
individualism’s culture of emotivism.  
 
A quick glance across the zemiological literature would suggest that the barrier of 
liberalism is not a problem for many critical social harm perspectives. Hillyard and 
Tombs (2017: 300) have spoken about the need to push beyond negative liberty 
organized around a ‘freedom from’ and link social harm to more a more ambitious 
positive liberty. Pemberton (2015) has similarly advocated this positive liberty, 
whilst also adding the rather Aristotelian language of social harm as the systemic 
compromising of ‘human flourishing’ and suggesting that a Rawlsian human needs 
approach is the best way to provide the guiding parameters of social harm (Doyal 
and Gough, 1984; 1991). Additionally, Copson (2011) has also advocated a human 
needs approach and bemoaned criminology’s reliance on the ‘liberal individualism’ 
of contemporary jurisprudence. Yar (2012) has adopted a promising ontological 
position by using Honneth’s (1996) theory of social recognition as the basis on 
which human flourishing can be cultivated.   
 
However, a closer look at the intellectual underpinnings of contemporary approaches 
to social harm, particularly those with foundations in Doyal and Gough’s (1984; 
1991) theory of human needs, reveals a persisting and unacknowledged influence of 
liberal individualist moral philosophy (see for example, Pemberton, 2015). Doyal 
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and Gough’s position is largely predicated upon the liberal philosopher John Rawls 
(1972) and his theory of redistributive justice, which attempts to develop an 
objective and rational test to determine the fair distribution of social goods in society. 
Rawls encourages the reader to imagine himself about to enter society standing 
behind a ‘veil of ignorance’. The reader does not know what position she would 
occupy in society, what social class she would belong to, what race or gender she 
might be, what talents she would possess, or what kind of society she is about to 
inhabit. Any rational individual, Rawls argues, would therefore agree that each 
person would have an equal right and access to an extensive set of basic liberties and 
human needs, and that goods in society are distributed equally unless an unequal 
distribution of these goods would benefit the least favoured in society. Rawls is 
essentially attempting to manage and resolve the core tension at the heart of 
liberalism’s political philosophy. The debate between the libertarians and classical 
liberals who view any taxation and redistribution of goods as theft, and those social 
liberals who see that a balance must be struck between individual liberty and the 
needs of the majority. Of course, since the collective majority (traditionally 
represented by the left) fragmented into innumerable minority interest groups, the 
minority group of the financial elite have used their political-economic clout to win 
this battle repeatedly over the past forty years, as the left has endured defeat after 
defeat (Dean, 2016).  
 
However, the most problematic aspect about Rawls’ (1972) theory of justice is that, 
as MacIntyre (2011) observes, it separates morality from desire. This is antithetical 
to the teleological ethic of Aristotle, who saw morality not as a given but as an 
achievement; not as distinct from personal happiness, human flourishing and social 
advancement but as a fundamental and necessary spur to those pursuits. Modern 
liberal individualists, however, often treat morality as an impediment acting against 
natural inclinations, individual desires and social progress. We see it in Kant’s 
categorical imperative, which views morality as acting out of a sense of duty to 
universalizable moral norms, denying ourselves particular desires and interests if for 
no other reason than to avoid them being inflicted upon ourselves. We see it in Rawls 
who can only imagine people acting in an ethical and equitable manner when they 
are standing behind a ‘veil of ignorance’.  We also see it in Mill, who wrote that the 
readiness to serve the happiness of others through the sacrifice of his own happiness 
or desire is “the highest virtue that can be found in man”. Therefore, instead of trying 
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to develop a society which cultivates subjectivities which reconnect morality and 
desire, moral and pro-social behavior is reduced to the act of mere rule-following. 
As MacIntyre writes: 
 
“[W]hat sort of person am I to become? This is in a way an inescapable question 
in that an answer to it is given in practice in each human life. But for 
characteristically modern moralities it is a question to be approached only by 
indirection. The primary question from their standpoint has concerned rules: 
what rules ought we to follow? And why ought we obey them? [...] the central 
doctrine of modern liberalism is the thesis that questions about the good life for 
man or the ends of human life are to be regarded from the public standpoint as 
systematically unsettlable. On these individuals are free to agree or to disagree. 
The rules of morality and law hence are not to be derived from or justified in 
terms of some more fundamental conception of the good for man”. (Macintyre, 
[1981] 2011: 138). 
 
We can see within the above quote the questions that liberal-postmodernism’s 
cynical individualist can quickly pose when morality is separated from desire and 
reduced to an act of mere rule-following. A good example of the problems generated 
by this approach can be found when we consider one of the most pressing types of 
social harm—climate change. Environmental issues tend to be framed as being at 
odds with personal desires. We are encouraged to change our consumption habits, 
buy re-usable coffee cups, and find ways of reducing or negating our carbon 
footprint when we travel. Appeals are made to alleviate the suffering experienced by 
animals, or to fulfill our duty to live sustainably in order to ensure a future for our 
children and grandchildren. The underlying message from those trying to stimulate 
change is that we must act against our self-interest or desires. While it is 
inconvenient to painstakingly check labels and recycle, to carry a reusable coffee 
cup wherever you go, or to walk or cycle when it would be much quicker and 
convenient to drive a car, such measures must be taken no matter how painful.  
 
However, such approaches quickly fall apart. As Shaw and Bonnett (2016) have 
argued, we are increasingly witnessing the perpetuation of environmental harm 
through a form of nihilistic grief and loss. Overwhelmed by the daunting scale of 
change required to avert environmental catastrophe and convinced that things seem 
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to have gone too far, there is no incentive to act against one’s sovereign desires. This 
defeatism prompts depressive forms of consumption that can be witnessed in 
practices such as extinction tourism, in which companies arrange trips to see certain 
places, populations or species that are on the borderline of extinction. Here, these 
consumers and companies flagrantly perpetuate the same environmental harms that 
have driven these places and populations to near-extinction in the name of ‘seeing it 
before its gone’. Moreover, in contemporary society there has been a reorientation 
of the cultural super-ego toward a cultural injunction to enjoy (Žižek, 2002). Rather 
than feel guilt or shame for spending money on new clothes or going on a big night-
out; the contemporary reoriented super-ego is now more likely to feel guilty for not 
doing so, driven by the sense that others are living more exciting, fulfilling and 
enjoyable lives. This is most effectively captured by the hashtag FOMO (fear of 
missing-out) and bucket-list tourism which provides an itinerary of travel and 
tourism experiences that one simply has to experience before they die (Thurnell-
Read, 2017).  
 
Despite these flawed intellectual underpinnings, Pemberton’s (2015) approach to 
social harm as the compromising of human flourishing offers the possibility for 
resolving this issue around the separation of desire from morality. Whether 
intentional or not, this is a very Aristotelian term that implicitly suggests that human 
beings possess a particular goal, purpose or perfected state of being which the 
individual is constantly striving towards. This is what Aristotle would call the telos 
of human life. It is not something which is left up to the individual to decide privately 
for themselves, nor can it be achieved individually. Rather, the telos (or human 
flourishing) is developed through a shared deliberation about the common human 
good and the kinds of subjectivities, virtues, characteristics and social institutional 
values that are required for its achievement. It can only be achieved through a 
properly ethical and political participation within the communities to which we 
belong. To marry this with Žižek’s language, this notion of human flourishing and 
what it demands would become enshrined within the shared meanings, values, 
customs and institutions of the Symbolic Order and the Big Other. As the likes of 
MacIntyre (2011) and Lutz (2012) argue, this telos could provide the objective 
reference point that can not only resolve moral or zemiological disagreements, but 
also offer guidance as to how to live the Good life. We can see how this notion of 
human flourishing differs from the idea of the ‘Good life’ in the liberal-individualist 
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culture of late-capitalism; which is often a private pursuit of consumer pleasures and 
personal success which can be achieved in spite of, and is often contingent upon, the 
suffering or degradation of others (Hall et al, 2008).  
 
However, Pemberton (2015) fails to offer much guidance on what actually 
constitutes human flourishing. Instead, he limits his analysis to the conditions 
necessary for ‘human flourishing’ without considering the ends they are geared 
towards. Given the scale of such a task, this absence is entirely understandable. The 
restrictions of space similarly prohibit this article from offering an outline of what 
the Good life for human persons might be and what human flourishing looks like. 
However, what was required was an acknowledgment that the potentially 
substantive yet currently diaphanous content of human flourishing—a shared vision 
of the Good life for human persons and society—is the vital component that can 
reconnect morality and desire to provide the basis from which we can derive an 
understanding of what we consider to be social harm. Without this, Lutz (2012) 
argues, “there is no such measure by which the good or evil of desires or actions 
could be judged, and the contingent facts about the random desires of individuals 
would have no clear relationship with moral rules intended to only curb abusive 
behaviour” (Lutz, 2012: 63). 
 
In the absence of this acknowledgment, two interrelated problems arise, both of 
which prohibit zemiology from realising its self-proclaimed desire to push beyond 
negative liberty and conceptualise social harm as the systemic compromising of 
human flourishing. Firstly, to place human flourishing as the objective reference 
point for social harm and ethics is a positive first step; but without an 
acknowledgment of the need for a shared conception of the Good life and a human 
telos, ‘human flourishing’ provides nothing more than an empty signifier. It remains 
at the discretion of each sovereign individual to privately decide what constitutes the 
Good life for her; inevitably resulting in vastly divergent conceptions which will 
inevitably clash with others’ privately defined ideas of human flourishing. The 
central tenet of liberal individualism remains intact, perpetuating the ‘culture of 
emotivism’ as described by MacIntyre above, and zemiology remains trapped within 
the confines of liberalism’s ideological understanding of ‘freedom’. This, Deneen 
(2018) and Macintyre (2011) argue, was liberalism’s great historical achievement. 
In the pre-liberal world of Aristotle, liberty was defined as the conquest of base 
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desires and the development of practical moral reasoning to know how to act, what 
is best and right to choose and desire in order to pursue a shared conception of the 
Good. However, liberalism has located liberty within the sovereign individual, as 
the right to pursue pluralistic, personal and privately defined notions of the Good 
free from religious, cultural or moral intervention.  
  
This perversion of the notion of liberty creates the second interrelated problem. It 
has enabled liberal individualism to hijack notions of ‘positive liberty’ and create an 
essentially false distinction between positive and negative forms of liberty (Hall, 
2012a). While theories of human need claim to espouse a notion of positive liberty 
(Doyal and Gough, 1984; 1991; Pemberton, 2015), what this really amounts to is a 
slightly more ambitious, welfare-oriented and socialistic brand of negative liberty 
with a different name. It extends the traditional negative liberties of the right to life; 
freedom from torture; freedom of expression and so on to include equal access to 
physical and mental health services; education and personal development; and 
employment, among others. However, this does not constitute a radical departure 
from the moral philosophy of liberal individualism and its primacy upon individual 
sovereignty, merely a more comfortable ledge for the majority to rest upon as they 
pursue their personal dreams. With no ethical or teleological substance to guide a 
common understanding of the Good life for human persons, the sovereign individual 
is simply provided with more services and tools to enable them to pursue their own 
personal wants and desires. Under this framework, positive liberty is defined as the 
provider of basic material needs and services for individuals to enact their freedom 
to behave according to their sovereign view of the good life. Positive and negative 
liberty thus collapse into one another. We can see this quite clearly when we examine 
Doyal and Gough’s work on theorizing human needs. In a passage that reads as 
remarkably similar to Žižek’s (2008) post-political biopolitics described above, the 
scope of liberty is limited to a choice between a society of unshackled capitalist 
production or a state which ensures equal access to high standards of health, 
education and abundant employment and so on in order to expand the individual’s 
choices so that they can freely decide their own destinies:     
  
“As we have hinted in the introduction, conceptions of liberation as a 
generalisable goal have traditionally been interpreted either as unlimited 
material production or the expansion of individual choice…For our purposes, 
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the first formulation is problematic because it is now clear that for a variety of 
social, economic and ecological reasons the dream of unrestrained production 
has for many turned into a nightmare of Taylorism, unemployment, pollution, 
corporate imperialism, the fear of nuclear destruction and the exhaustion of 
global resources. This has in turn focused attention on the ‘quality of life’, again 
highlighting the importance of the distinction between wants and needs. Thus, 
the second approach to theorising liberational needs - optimising the 
satisfaction of basic individual needs in principle and in practice - seems more 
promising if it can be shown to be conceptually and strategically coherent” 
(Doyal and Gough, 1984: 23). 
 
Alain Badiou has suggested that in a contemporary society oriented towards a 
negative rights-based ethos, “[e]vil is that from which the Good is derived, not the 
other way around” (Badiou, 2001: 9). Badiou argues this precludes any genuine 
transformation of society. What we require in our effort to clearly identify, recognise 
and provide parameters for social harm is a fundamental reversal of Badiou’s (2001) 
diagnosis of our current predicament. What we are striving for in defining harm is 
an idea of the Good from which social harm is derived. Simon Pemberton has 
expressed this precise sentiment when he writes that “we gain an understanding of 
harm exactly because it represents the converse reality of an imagined desirable 
state” (Pemberton, 2015: 32).  
 
Therefore, it is suggested that we should take up the mantle from Pemberton (2015) 
and drive forward to flesh out a fully-fledged theory of what constitutes human 
flourishing. Lasslett (2010) has suggested that we should do the exact opposite and 
move away from grounding harm in an ‘ethical conception of man’ and return to 
more objective and robust ontological theories of harm. However, if we return to 
Žižek’s ontology of the subject, we can see that this separation of ontology from 
ethics is misguided and ultimately fruitless. At the ontological core of the subject 
lies a void, and identifying with a Symbolic Order of shared meanings, customs and 
ethics is a fundamentally necessary part of identity formation, the development of 
subjectivity and the constitution of a social world. Therefore, the formation of a 
Symbolic Order and an associated ethics is a fundamental part of the organic and 
inorganic reproduction of man, without which subjectivity, identity, relationships 
and other fundamental human needs cannot exist. Social harm, therefore, is not an 
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ontological or an ethical issue. Rather, it is an ethical issue by way of the subject’s 
ontology. If social harm is to transcend the liberalism’s scarcely challengeable 
hegemony and its associated culture of emotivism, it must take heed of this 
fundamental ontological insight and observe the subject’s need for the formation of 
a strong and coherent Symbolic Order, with a clear and collective notion of human 
flourishing at its core.  It is the absence of this shared deliberation of the Good—
precluded by liberal-postmodernism—that stymies our efforts to arrive at a clear, 
coherent but open-ended understanding of social harm. Despite the apparent 
pessimism of the preceding pages, this brings us to the more optimistic kernel of the 
argument that concludes this article. Social harm is not merely a concept that 
identifies what is socially, environmentally and politically-economically corrosive 
in our society. On the contrary, defining social harm is fundamentally bound up with 
constructing an imagination for the type of lives we want to lead, the society we 
want to live in, and the subjectivities we want to cultivate. Thus, social harm 
becomes a transformative concept which allows us to think beyond the horizons of 
liberal-capitalism.  
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